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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE AS
APPLIED TO ENFORCEMENT
OF TAX JUDGMENTS
CLARK

R

J. A.

HAZELWOOD

ECENTLY it was discovered by the Wisconsin Tax Commission
that a corporation located in Chicago, Illinois, but licensed to conduct business in Wisconsin, had earned enormous profits during a short
period of operation in Wisconsin, had then withdrawn from this state
all its property and business, leaving behind an indebtedness to the
state, county, and city, wherein its business had been carried on, in the
sum of approximately $50,000.00 for state income taxes.
The legal 'departments of the county and state determined to enforce payment of this substantial claim, but their initial efforts have
been curtailed by a decision of the United States District Court of the
Northern District of Illinois, in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Company, a'corporatioih. The case is now pending upon an appeal to
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.
The question of law presented therein is of considerable interest to
tax collecting authorities of many of the states. A discussion on the subject was recently held at the conference of Attorneys General at the
Milwaukee meeting of the American Bar Association.
The issue can be observed by reviewing the proceedings taken in
the White Company case. After the tax assessment was determined
by the Tax Commission and due notice thereof was given to the tax
debtor, and after the tax debtor failed to take an appeal from the
Commission's determination of the amount of the assessment and the
time for appeal by the debtor to the Wisconsin courts had expired, an
action against the M. E. White Company was filed in the Milwaukee
County Circuit Court, jurisdiction having been obtained by the service
of process within the State of Wisconsin.
The debtor company failed to defend this suit. Milwaukee County,
as plaintiff in said action on behalf of the state, city, and county, was
awarded a default judgment, the same being duly entered and docketed
in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County. The judgment still remains
of record and no attempt has been made to disturb it.
The suit in the District Court was commenced upon a complaint
asking for a judgment against M. E. White Company of Chicago,
based upon the judgment of the Wisconsin Circuit Court. The court was
asked to enforce this Wisconsin judgment, the plaintiff relying upon
the so-called "Full Faith and Credit" provision of the United States
1_.

F. Supp.

.

(1934).
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Constitution.2 Under the powers invested in it by this Section, Congress in 1790 provided for the authentication of records and judicial
proceedings of the courts of the States, and prescribed the effect of
3
such authenticated record.
Since the Wisconsin judgment which formed the basis of the action
was properly authenticated and exemplified in the manner prescribed
by the Act of Congress above cited, it becomes material to inquire
what limitations or restrictions, if any, are or should be imposed upon
the apparently universal and all-embracing requirement that "full faith
and credit" be given to judgments of sister states.
In National Surety Co. v. Milligan,4 the court said, in touching upon
this point:
"The only defenses that can be made to a judgment obtained in another state, when sued upon here, are that the court of our sister state
did not have jurisdiction of the person or of the subject-matter; that
it was fraudulently procured, or had been paid."'
As a corollary to the rule that judgments of sister states can be attacked only on the three grounds above stated, namely (1) lack of
jurisdiction in the original state court where the judgment was entered,
(2) fraudulent procurement or (3) payment, it has been generally
held that the merits or validity of the claim upon which the judgment
is founded cannot be re-examined in the court of the sister state.6
But the District Court in the White Company case apparently holds
that there is a fourth ground on which the judgment of a court of a
sister state can be successfully attacked, namely that where the demand
2 U.S. Const. Art. IV, Section 1.

3 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11; 28 U.S.C.A. § 687 (1926), providing,
"The acts of the legislature of any State or Territory, or of any country
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be authenticated by having the seals of such State, Territory, or country affixed thereto. The records
and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State or Territory, or of any
such country, shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United
States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if
there be a seal, together with a-certificate of the judge, chief justice or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form and the said records
and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or
usage in the court of the State from which they are taken."
4 105 N.J.L. 336, 341, 146 Atl. 372 (1929).
5 See, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v Harris, 97 U.S. 331, 335, 24 L.Ed 959 (1877);
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 302, 18 L.Ed. 475 (1866).
6 Christmasv. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 302, 18 L.Ed. 475 (1866) ; Thompson v. Whitnan, 18 Wall. 457, 461, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873); Knowles v. Longsport Gas &
Coke Co., 19 Wall. 58, 60, 22 L.Ed. 70 (1873); Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U.S.
1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29 L. Ed. 535 (1885) ; Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U.S. 277, 297,
6 Sup. Ct. 1194, 29 L.Ed. 629 (1886) ; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666,
13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892) ; Fauntleroy v. Lunt, 210 U.S. 230, 236,
28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908); Kennedy v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S.
411, 415, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64 L.Ed. 638 (1920) ; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S.
449, 48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365 (1928).
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is by a sister state itself, or a political subdivision thereof, and where
it is revealed that the original demand in the court of the sister state
was on a cause of action created by the law of said state as a method
of furthering its own governmental interests, by taxation or otherwise,
such revelation is fatal to the plaintiff's reliance upon the "full faith
and credit" clause.
It is reasoned that since the "full faith and credit" clause cannot
be extended to cover such cases as the claim against the White Company, the suit must then fall under the rule barring original suits for
tax claims outside of the state which imposes the taxes. Where, for
example, John Doe owes the State of Wisconsin $500.00 for income
taxes, although he can be sued in Wisconsin for the $500.00, if he has
moved to Illinois, no Illinois court and hence no federal court in Illinois will entertain an original suit against him. This doctrine is upheld,
apparently, upon the reasoning that a state is more than sufficiently
occupied in the enforcement of its own revenue laws, without being
called up to assist in the enforcement of the revenue laws of a sister
state. This doctrine arises from ancient rules barring the courts of one
country to the revenue agencies of another. It is difficult to see
why, with respect to tax laws, states of this Union should be regarded
as separate nations.
It is difficult to see why a tax indebtedness owing to any state in the
Union should not be considered in courts of other states to be a debt
with as high standing as any other indebtedness owing to citizens and
residents of sister states. In other words, while Wisconsin is barred
from the use of Illinois courts for tax suits, an individual from anywhere can enter the Illinois courts and sue to collect his just debts.
Yet a tax indebtedness is no less an obligation with a quid pro quo
than other debts. Persons assessed with taxes have received the protection of the state government. The tax is the price they are called
upon to pay for that protection.
There is cooperation between states in the enforcement of criminal
laws through extradition. It seems that a similar spirit is needed in the
matter of revenue laws.
Yet there is a line of decisions barring suits by taxing authorities of
one state in sister states, regardless of the merits of the claims.7 The

7Moore v.

Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600 (C.C.A., 2d, 1929), 65 A.L.R. 1352; affirmed
on other grounds by the United States Supreme Court, 281 U.S. 18, 50 Sup.
Ct. 175, 74 L.Ed. 673 (1930) ; Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357
(1921) ; In the -matterof Bliss, 202 N.Y.S. 185 (1923) ; State of Maryland v.
Turner, 132 N.Y.S. 173 (1911); Estate of Martin, 240 N.Y.S. 393 (1930);
N. Y. Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corp., 11 F. (2d) 698 (C.C.A., 2d,
1926) ; Municipal Council of Sidney v. Bull, [1909] 1 K.B. 7; and cases collected in Note, 65 A.L.R. 1360.
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rule of these cases however has not been directly affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court.
But this has been a digression from the main issue, namely that,
assuming the rule of the Harbeck s and similar cases to be the law, is
not a sovereign state or subdivision thereof entitled to the benefit of
the "full faith and credit" clause after its tax claim has been reduced
to judgment?
Formulators of the Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, 9
have prepared the following statement:
"ACTION ON JUDGMENT ON GOVERNMENT CLAIM. No action can be
maintained on a foreign judgment which has been obtained in favor of
a state, a state agency, or a private person on a cause of action created
by the law of the foreign state as a method of furthering its own governmental interests."

The following was added to the above statement in June, 1934:
"Comment:
"The rule stated in this Section is not applicable to a judgment upon
a claim for payment for a privilege given or service rendered by the
state for a price.
"Illustration:
"A, a foreign corporation, applies for permission to do local business in State X. Permission is granted by X on terms, among others,
that a certain fee be paid by A. A fails to pay the fee. X sues A and
secures a judgment for the amount of the fee. X may sue A in Y
upon the judgment and may recover thereon."
The addition of the above comment was made by the committee
after their attention was called to the case of People v. Coe Manufacturing Company.'0 The court, in that case, held that the state of New
York might bring an action in a New Jersey court on a New York
judgment obtained for taxes imposed by a New York statute. In his
very illuminating opinion in the New Jersey Supreme Court case, Judge
Caffrey pointed out,"
"Of course, if this were an original suit for the collection of taxes
due to the state of New York, the plaintiff would be without relief,
because the principle is well settled, without the need of citation, that
the courts of one state will not enforce a claim for taxes as such in
any other jurisdiction than that in which the taxes are due. Colorado
v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357.
"As I view this matter, the suit in this court is not for the collection
of taxes, but for the collection of a judgment which is based on a tax
8 Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921).

9 Draft 34 (Oct. 16, 1930) See. 621.
10 10 N.J. Misc. 116, 162 AtI. 872 (1932), [affrmed in 172 AtI. 198 (1934)].
11 10 N.J. Misc. 116, 162 AtI. 872, 873 (1932).
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claim, and the original characterof the claim. has been merged in the
judgment. In so holding I am not unmindful of Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123, nor Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company, 127 U.S. 265, 8 S.Ct. 1370, 32 L.Ed. 239." (Italics
ours.)
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus makes a distinction between
an action brought by one state in the courts of another state to enforce
a claim for taxes as such and an action brought on a judgment obtained for taxes.
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, being the highest
court of that state, on the appeal of the Coe case, affirmed the same in
all respects on April 12, 1934,12 and it was stated by Judge Lloyd, who
delivered the opinion of that court that:
"The right of the state of New York to exclude corporations of
other states cannot be open to question, and its right to admit such
corporations for the transaction of business within its borders upon
such terms as it deems wise is likewise not open to question. When,
therefore, as a privilege of transacting its business therein the state
exacted for that privilege a franchise tax or sum of money proportioned to the earning power of the corporation, it was wholly within its
rights. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271.
It was then optional with the corporation to avail itself of the privilege
accorded or to refrain from doing so. When it did avail itself of the
opportunity thus afforded it did so under the implied obligation that
it would comply with the conditions upon which it was permitted to
enter.
"Its own action carried with it, under the interpretation as given
to the statute by the courts of that state (binding here) the obligation
to personally see that the license fees or franchise taxes were paid. It
could not accept the "benefits without incurring the burdens. It is true
the statute imposed certain penalties for failure to comply with the obligation thus assumed, but these were nothing more than the obligation
frequently imposed in ordinary contracts between individuals and became as it were liquidated damages for the breach.
"The state of New York, having in its own court recovered judgment against the appellant, (the appellant having been personally
served and present therein), jurisdiction of the person was obtained.
When it was there determined that the statute imposed a personal liability upon the corporation it was the construction by the court of that
state of its own laws. Having been so determined the appellant was
concluded on those two phases of the litigation and could not thereafter deny jurisdiction either of the subject matter or of the person;
nor could it assert another interpretation of the act.
"Our added view is that even though the door to contend that the
statute creates penalties which may not be enforced outside the state
of New York be open to the appellant in this state, (which may be de12

(N.J. Errors & Apps., 1934) 172 At. 198.
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batable) the action was not to collect such penalty, but to collect a debt
which the appellant had impliedly agreed to pay.
"If such claims as are here presented were not enforceable against
foreign corporations wherever found, the states of the Union would
be subject to grave wrongs from without, inasmuch as corporations establish important connections in states other than those of their incorporation, and transact large business therein without the investment of
a dollar or the placing of tangible property within their borders whereby redress may be had against corporations in default."
Thus the decision of the District Court in the White Company case
is in almost direct conflict with the above quoted New Jersey decision.
An examination of authorities and text-writers shows that the odds
should be in favor of a reversal of the White Company case when and
13
if the same reaches the United States Supreme Court.
In general the courts in refusing to enforce revenue claims arising
in other states rely merely upon the reiteration of the rule "that one
state does not enforce the revenue laws of another."'14 The reasons
(additional burden placed upon the courts, difficulty in making an
assessment in conformity with the complex foreign statutes and the
fact that the nature of the tax might be inconsistent with established
local policy) for refusing to entertain a foreign tax suit are not applicable where the tax claim has been reduced to judgment, as the local
court would have to consider only matters of jurisdiction or collateral
defenses which might be raised in the taxing state. 15 Some courts have
advanced so far as to recognize penal judgments of sister states under
the "full faith and credit" clause, to allow claims by another state for
accrued and unpaid corporate franchise taxes, and in the case of executors, administrators and corporate receivers seeking reimbursement for
payment of foreign taxes, to recognize foreign revenue laws . 6 The
difficulty of enforcing judgments is increased by the present concentration of wealth in the form of easily transportable intangibles.17 Corporations having their property located and business conducted in other
states than the one in which incorporated, can in most cases escape
satisfaction of judgments for its franchise tax.:' Where pernicious results flow from the application of an arbitrary rule to situations where
the reason for the rule does not apply, it is reasonable to presume
Comment (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1131; Note and Comment (1933 18 Cornell L. Q.
581; Note (1929) 29 Columbia L. Rev. 782; Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of
Penal Governmental Claitns, (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
14Note and Comment (1933) 18 Cornell L. Q. 584.
'5 Comment (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1131.
26Note (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 782, 790-791.
18 Comment (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1131.
I Leflar, ExtrastateBnforcement of Penal Government Claims, (1932) 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 193, 215.
13
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that the United States Supreme Court will hold that a revenue judgment must be given "full faith and credit."
In support of the claim that the constitutional mandate as to "full
faith and credit" ought not apply to suits on tax judgments, much
reliance is placed on Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co. 19 In that
case a Wisconsin statute imposed a penalty of $500.00 a month
upon any fire insurance company which transacted business in
the state without depositing with the commissioner of insurance an
annual statement of its business and property. The state of Wisconsin
in a Wisconsin court sued a fire insurance company of Louisiana which
was doing business in Wisconsin, alleged a violation of the statute and
demanded the penalties provided thereunder. A judgment was rendered and the state then instituted an original action thereon against the
defendant in the United States Supreme Court. The defendant pleaded
that the judgment was founded upon a punitive and penal claim, and
that the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court extended only to controversies of a civil nature. This contention was sustained by the court and judgment was entered for the defendant. It is
apparent that the actual decision in this case went no further than to
hold that the United States Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction of a suit brought by a state upon a judgment for a penal claim,
and the construction of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution, relating to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, was
alone involved. However, the court discussed the application of the
"full faith and credit" clause, and made various statements, such as
that "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another" and
that this rule applied "to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery
of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection
of its revenue * * * and to all judgments for such penalties."
Giving these statements their full weight, although they appear to
be only dicta in the case, it will be noted that the cause of action in the
Pelican case was not the same as a tax claim. It was a "pecuniary penalty" or punishment for doing a prohibited deed. A tax, on the other
hand, is, in the writer's opinion, a debt of a higher nature than the
obligation to pay a forfeiture. But the Pelican case, so far as it might
apply to the issue here discussed, has been revised in later United
States Supreme Court decisions in such a way as to eliminate it as
authority upon the applicability of the "full faith and credit" provision
of the Federal Constitution.
In Huntington v. Attrill ° a New York statute was involved which
imposed liability upon officers and directors of a New York corpora19127 U.S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L.Ed. 239 (1888).
29146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892).
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tion for all debts of the corporation, if they made and filed any false
certificate. The defendant, a director of a New York corporation,
signed and recorded a certificate which falsely stated that all the capital stock of the company had been paid in. The plaintiff, a creditor of
the company, sued the defendant in New York under the New York
statute and secured a judgment. The plaintiff then brought a bill in
equity in Maryland, setting up the New York judgment and seeking
to set aside an alleged fraudulent transfer of property by the defendant
to another. The Maryland court dismissed the bill on the ground that
since the New York judgment was based upon a penalty it was not
entitled to enforcement in the courts of another state. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the state court and held
that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit.
Mr. Justice Gray also rendered the opinion of the court in this
case, and stated that the doctrine enunciated in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., applied only to claims which were "penal in the international sense," the test being whether or not the law was one which
imposed "punishment for an offense committed against the state, and
which the executive of the state has the power to pardon."
The action involved in Huntington v. Attrill was held not to fall
within the said defense, because although penal in a sense, it was,
nevertheless, not a criminal or quasi-criminal law. It was penal in imposing a burdensome liability on the officers for their unlawful act,
but it gave a civil remedy in which recovery was measured by the
amount of the debt due to the creditor, and in this sense was clearly
remedial. A judgment upon such claim was, therefore, held to be entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of sister states.
In Fauntleroyv. Lur 21 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into
a gambling transaction in Mississippi involving cotton futures. This
transaction was void under the law of Mississippi. A controversy
thereafter arising over a loss was submitted to arbitration in Missouri,
and an award was rendered for the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit
on this award in Missouri and recovered a judgment. The plaintiff then
sued upon this judgment, in Mississippi. The court gave judgment for
the defendant, on the ground that the original cause of action arose in
Mississippi, by whose law it was illegal and against public policy. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the state
court. Mr. Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the court, said
(at page 236) :
" * * * We proceed at once to the further question, whether the
illegality of the original cause of action in Mississippi can be relied
upon there as a ground for denying a recovery upon a judgment of
another state.
21210

U.S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908).
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"The doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Marshall was 'that the
judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and
effect in every other court in the United States which it had in the
state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good
to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded in any
other court in the United States.' Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234,
4 L.Ed. 378. There is no doubt that this quotation was supposed to be
an accurate statement of the law as late as Christmasv. Russell, 5 Wall.
290, 18 L.Ed. 475, where an attempt of Mississippi, by statute, to go
behind judgments recovered in other states, was declared void, and it
was held that such judgments could not be impeached even for fraud.
"But the law is supposed to have been changed by the decision in
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 32 L.Ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1370. That was a suit brought in this court by the state of Wisconsin upon a Wisconsin judgment against a foreign corporation. The
judgment was for a fine or penalty imposed by the Wisconsin statutes
upon such corporations doing business in the state and failing to make
certain returns, and the ground of decision was that the jurisdiction
given to this court by Art. 3, Sec. 2, as rightly interpreted by the
judiciary act, now Rev. Stat. Sec. 687, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 565,
was confined to 'controversies of a civil nature', which the judgment in
suit was not. The case was not within the words of Art. 4, Sec. 1, and,
if it had been, still it would not have, and could not have, decided anything relevant to the question before us. It is true that language was
used which has been treated as meaning that the original claim upon
which a judgment is based may be looked into further than Chief Justice Marshall supposed. But evidently it meant only to justify the conclusion reached upon the specific point decided, for the proviso was
inserted that a court 'cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of
examining into the validity of the claim.' 127 U.S. 293. However, the
whole passage was only a dictum and it is not worth while to spend
much time upon it.
"A judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi (United
States v. California & 0. Land Co., 192 U.S. 355, 48 L.Ed. 476, 24
Sup. Ct. Rep. 266) ; and it needs no authority to show that it cannot
be impeached either in or out of the state by showing that it was based
upon a mistake of law. * * * "

Kennedy v. Supreme Lodge,22 involved a suit in Illinois upon an
Alabama judgment recovered for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's
intestate. The defendant set up a statute of Illinois which provided that
no action could be brought in that state for wrongful death caused in
another state. The Supreme Court of the United States held that this
statute could not constitutionally be applied to judgments, and that the
Alabama judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, even though
the original cause of action could not have been maintained in Illinois.
22252

U.S. 411, 40 Sup Ct. 371, 64 L.Ed. 638 (1920).
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In Roche v. McDonaid23 a judgment was recovered in Oregon upon
a Washington judgment, more than six years after the judgment had
been rendered. Suit was thereafter brought in Washington upon the
Oregon judgment, and the defendant set up a statute of Washington
which provided that after six years from its rendition, a judgment
should cease to be a charge against the judgment debtor. The United
States Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution required the judgment be enforced even though the cause
of action upon which it was based could not have been sued on in
Washington. Mr. Justice Sanford stated that since the court which
rendered the Oregon judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of
the subject matter of the suit, the judgment was as valid and conclusive in the courts of the state where it was sued upon as it was in
the state where it had been rendered.
From the foregoing it would seem reasonable to conclude that an
indebtedness founded upon a judgment for taxes in any state ought to
be enforceable in the courts of all other states and in the Federal courts
wherever jurisdiction of the debtor can be obtained.

23 275

U.S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L.Ed. 365 (1928).

